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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DIANA CHILDS,
(fka Diane Callahan)
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
WILLIAM K. CALLAHAN,

Case No. 990051-CA

Respondent/ Appellee.

Priority 15

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
The Appellant, Diana Childs, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, submits this Appeal Brief.
Statement of Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a3(2)(h) 1953, as amended. The order appealed from is a final order disposing of all claims of
the parties.
Statement of Issues
Presented by Appellant
Appellant presents the following issues for this Court's review:

1.

Did the trial court err in holding that Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112 (Utah

App. 1998), precluded a modification of the Decree of Divorce to award the Petitioner/Appellant
(hereinafter "Petitioner") a share of that portion of the Respondent/Appellee's (hereinafter
"Respondent") military retirement which accrued to him during the marriage in spite of the
implementation language of the Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (hereinafter
"USFSPA") 10 USCA § 1401?
2.

Did the trial court err in ruling, as a matter of law, that the Petitioner,

whose divorce decree was entered during the "gap" period between the McCartv decision and
the effective date of the USFSPA, was not entitled to retroactive application of USFSPA as
provided in 10 USCA § 1401(c)(1)?
3.

Did the trial court err in holding that the Respondent's post-decree return

to military service and subsequent entitlement to a military retirement, which utilized thirteen
(13) years of active duty service that had accrued to him during the parties' marriage, was not
a substantial change in circumstances which warranted a modification of the Decree as provided
under the USFSPA?
Standard of Appellate Review
The granting of a Motion to Dismiss is appropriate only when there are no issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c), Higgins v. County, 855 P.2d 235 (Utah 1984). The Court of Appeals reviews the trial
court's conclusions of law for correctness, granting them no deference. Ferree v. State, 784

2

P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). On appeal, the Court of Appeals determines only whether the trial
court erred in applying the governing law and whether the "trial court correctly held that there
were no disputed issues of material fact". IcL In reviewing the trial court's decision, the Court
of Appeals views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and will find
summary judgment, or a Motion to Dismiss, proper only when there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rules
of Civ. P. 56(c). Drvsdale v. Ford Motor Company, 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997).
Determinative Authorities
A.

Federal Statutes: The Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act,

10 USCA § 1401, et seq., legislatively overrides the U.S. Supreme Court decision in McCarty
v. McCartv. 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2 583 (U.S. 1981). As a result of the
passage of the USFSPA, military retirements are allocable as part of the divorce proceedings.
The relevant portion of the USFSPA is 10 USCA § 1401(c)(1) which relates to divorce decrees
that were entered between June 26, 1981, and February 1, 1983, the effective date of the
USFSPA. That period of time is generally known as the "gap" period of the USFSPA.
B.

Utah Statutes: The primary statutory provision regarding the allocation

or property in a divorce action is U.C.A. § 30-3-5, et seq., (1953), as amended.
C.

Utah Case Law: In making its determination, the trial court referred to

the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Toone v. Toone. 952 P.2d 112 (Utah App. 1998). That
case held that enactment of the Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act was a change

3

in the law which, in itself, could not be considered a substantial change in circumstances which
would allow modification of a Divorce Decree to allocate the retirement benefits to Petitioner
as would otherwise be provided under the USFSPA.
Statement of Case
A.

Nature of Case. This is an appeal from a final order of the Second

Judicial District Court, Honorable Roger Dutson, which granted Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Petitioner filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce, based upon a substantial
change of circumstances, which was the vesting of the Respondent's military retirement
subsequent to the divorce, as well as the enactment of the USFSPA which allowed for a division
of the Respondent's military retirement.
The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6), or in the
alternative, 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
C.

Disposition in Trial Court.

The trial court, over Petitioner's objections and affidavits in opposition, granted the
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
D.

Statement of Relevant Facts.
1.

The Decree of Divorce was issued on March 10, 1982.

4

2.

The Decree addressed the issues of custody, alimony and property,

but the issue of Respondent's military retirement could not be addressed at the time of the
Decree because: 1) the U.S. Supreme Court decision of McCartv v. McCartv, 453 U.S. 210 101
S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed2 589 (U.S. 1981), which precluded allocation of military retirement by
state courts in cases of divorce; and, 2) the Respondent was not vested, and because of his nonaffiliation with any military reserve unit apparently had no possibility of becoming vested, in a
military retirement, at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered. (R.001; R.033; R.051;
R.058)
3.

At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered, Respondent had

separated from the U.S. Marine Corps after having accumulated thirteen (13) years towards the
minimum of twenty (20) years required before he could retire from the military. (R.002; R.057)
4.

At the time of the divorce, Respondent had been separated from the

military for about three (3) years and had not participated in any military or reserve activity
which would earn him the necessary credit towards military retirement. (R. 051)
5.

In 1985, the parties returned to Court to have the Respondent's

child support obligation modified. At that time, Petitioner had no knowledge that Respondent
had participated in any reserve military activities that would earn him credit towards military
retirement. (R. 028; R.034)
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6.

From the date of the Decree of Divorce until January 1998,

Petitioner was unaware that she might be entitled to one-half of the portion of Respondent's
military retirement benefits which had accrued during the parties' marriage. (R.002; R.028)
7.

After having become aware, through reading a newspaper article,

that she might be entitled to a portion of Respondent's military retirement benefits, Petitioner
made efforts to contact an attorney who might be qualified to represent her in this matter. After
speaking with three attorneys who did not feel qualified to deal with such a specialized matter,
Petitioner was referred to her current attorneys, all of whom are military reservists and familiar
with military retirement issues. (R.002; R.058; R.059)
8.

It appears that Respondent is now qualified to receive military

retirement benefits, having participated in reserve military activities since the Decree of Divorce
was entered. While Respondent will not actually receive military retirement benefits until his
60th birthday, in June 2003, it appears that he is now vested in those military retirement
benefits, having served in the active or reserve military for at least twenty (20) years. (R.051,
R.058)
9.

Because the Petitioner's Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce

was dismissed by the Court, she was denied the opportunity to further develop through discovery
the factual basis for this and other relevant changes of circumstances which would entitle her to
a modification of the Decree of Divorce. (R. 141-145)

6

Summary of Arguments
Summary judgment, or a Motion to Dismiss, should be granted only when the evidence,
considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates that there are no
genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The grounds considered by the court in granting the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss in
this case are that 1) relying on Toone, a change in the law, in this case the USFSPA, does not
constitute a "substantial change in circumstances" such as would justify a modification of a
decree of divorce; 2) that the policy of res judicata governs in this matter, in that the claims of
the Petitioner should have been presented prior to her current Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce; and, 3) that there were no other grounds constituting a "substantial change in
circumstances" which would justify a modification of the Decree of Divorce.
However, the facts in Toone can be distinguished because 1) the Decree of Divorce in
Toone was entered some ten (10) months after the implementation of the USFSPA and the
Petitioner in that case could have raised the issue of military retirement at the time of the
divorce; 2) the court in Toone did allocate retirement benefits, but petitioner/appellant did not
address the issue of Mr. Toone's military retirement; and, 3) Mr. Toone was qualified to receive
military retirement at the time of the Decree of Divorce, whereas Respondent in this matter was
not so qualified at the time of the Decree of Divorce.
Furthermore, in Masters v. Worslev, 777 P.2d 499 (Utah App. 1989), this Court held
that, where the moving party had no knowledge of the facts surrounding his claim at the time
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of trial, res judicata did not bar the pursuit of the matter on a modification. When the Decree
of Divorce in this matter was entered the Respondent/Appellee was not currently affiliated with
the military and had no prospect of becoming entitled to a military retirement. It appeared that
any military retirement was a dead issue at the time of the divorce. When a Petition to Modify
the Decree was made by the Petitioner in 1985, there was no mention of any current military
service by the Respondent. Between that time and 1998, Petitioner learned that Respondent was
now a Lieutenant Colonel and had therefore obviously participated in a military Reserve
program. It was only in 1998, when the Petitioner learned of the USFSPA and her right to
share in the Respondent's military retirement, that she expeditiously sought counsel and the filing
of a Petition to Modify the Decree.
Finally, regardless of the change of law represented by USFSPA, Respondent's postdecree re-affiliation with the military and apparent entitlement to a retirement which is based in
substantial part on the 13 years of active duty service that accrued during the marriage represents
a "substantial change" in circumstances which should be the basis for modifying the decree
utilizing the procedures set forth in USFSPA for that purpose.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER SPOUSES'
PROTECTION ACT (USFSPA) ALLOWS FOR
THE APPELLANT TO RECEIVE A PORTION
OF THE APPELLEE'S MILITARY
RETIREMENT BENEFITS
InMcCartvv. McCartv, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69L.Ed.2 583 (U.S. 1981), the
Supreme Court held that a state court could award an interest in a retired military officer's
retirement to a former spouse as a division of property in a divorce action.
In response to McCarty, Congress passed the Uniform Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act, which permitted the States to divide and distribute military retirement benefits
in divorce actions according to State law. 10 USCA § 1408(c)(1); S.Rep. No. 97-502, U.S.
Code, Cong. & Admin. News 1982 (July 22, 1982). Section 1408(c)(1) of the Act specifically
provides for retroactive application of the Act with respect to divorce decrees entered during the
period between McCartv and the date that the Act became effective.
Petitioner in this matter received her divorce decree squarely within the period of time
for which retroactive application was intended by Congress - the so-called "gap" period.
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) allows for the division and
distribution of retirement funds that accrued during the marriage. As such, the Petitioner should
have been granted a modification of her Decree of Divorce giving her a portion of the
Respondent's military retirement pay earned during the marriage.
9

While in Woodward, the Utah Supreme Court made no provision for the retroactive
application of the new legal concept, the USFSPA specifically allowed such retroactive
application for decrees that were entered within the "gap" period between McCartv and the
USFSPA. The Petitioner's Decree of Divorce falls squarely within this "gap" period. Petitioner
is clearly a member of the class of persons which Congress intended to benefit from the
retroactive application of the USFSPA.
POINT H
TOONE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
FACTS OF TfflS CASE
1.

In Toone, the Decree of Divorce was entered on December 16, 1983,

some ten months after the effective date of the USFSPA and after the closure of the "gap" for
which retroactive application of the statute was provided.
In this case, the Decree of Divorce was granted on March 10, 1982 - squarely within
that "gap" period.
2.

In Toone, the petitioner/appellant raised the issue of retirement, but did

not address the military retirement.
In this case, because McCartv was the law at the time, the Petitioner was precluded
from raising the issue of military retirement.
3.

In Toone, Mr. Toone was eligible for military retirement at the time of

the Decree of Divorce.
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In this case, the Respondent/Appellee was not eligible for military retirement at the
time of the Divorce and had no apparent intent to become so eligible until some time after
the entry of the Decree.
4.

In Toone, this Court held that a change in the law was not a

"substantial change of circumstance" which would justify the modification of a decree of
divorce. The law which had changed was the Utah Supreme Court case of Woodward v.
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) which established that civil service benefits were
marital assets and were properly a subject of distribution in a divorce. In Woodward, the
Utah Supreme Court made no provision for a retroactive application of the new legal
concept.
However, in this case, the USFSPA contains a specific provision which allows for a
retroactive application of the statute for decrees that were entered within the "gap" period under which the Petitioner falls. Petitioner is clearly a member of the class of persons
intended to benefit from the retroactive application of the USFSPA.
5.

In Toone the petitioner/appellant apparently relied solely on the change

of law under the USFSPA as her "substantial change of circumstances" justifying a
modification of the decree. Mr. Toone was already vested in his retirement when the decree
was entered.
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In this case, as set forth below in Section III of this Brief, the more compelling
"substantial change in circumstance" is the vesting of retirement benefits in the Respondent
after the Decree of Divorce.
POINT ffl
THE RETIREMENT OF THE APPELLEE SUBSEQUENT TO
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS A "SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES" ALLOWING FOR A MODIFICATION
In order for a member of the military to be vested with military retirement benefits,
they must have completed a minimum of twenty (20) years of creditable military service,
either through full-time active duty service or part-time reserve service.
In 1979, the Respondent separated from the U.S. Marine Corps, after serving on
active duty for thirteen years. At the time that he separated from the military, he had not
accrued enough creditable years to vest in any retirement benefits. When the parties in this
action divorced in 1982, the Respondent was not then affiliated with the military in any
capacity.
Even if the Decree in this matter had been entered after USFSPA, the Petitioner
would not have had any right to a portion of Respondent's military retirement because he did
not, at the time, have any vested right to such military retirement. Since he was not
affiliated with any military reserve at the time of the divorce there was no indication that he
would ever vest in any military retirement.
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However, at some time since 1985 the Respondent re-affiliated with the military and
now appears to have reached the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in a branch of the military
reserve forces. While the lower court's decision dismissing the Petitioner's Petition to
Modify the Decree of Divorce precluded discovery on the issue, it appears, because of the
rank that the Respondent has attained, that he now has at least twenty (20) years of creditable
service toward a retirement. At a minimum, even if he has not earned the retirement to
date, there is now a greater likelihood that he will vest in the retirement in the future.
The fact that the Respondent had no prospect of reaching twenty (20) years of
creditable military service at the time of the Decree of Divorce, but has reached that
milestone subsequent to the divorce is, in itself, a "substantial change in circumstances"
which would allow the Court to modify the Decree of Divorce and award a portion of that
retirement to the Petitioner.
POINT IV
BECAUSE MCCARTY WAS THE LAW AT THE TIME
OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE IN THIS
ACTION, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE
When the Decree of Divorce was entered in this case, McCartv was the law of the
land. As a result, the Petitioner was precluded from asserting her right to a portion of the
Respondent's military retirement at that time.
Additionally, at the time that the Decree of Divorce was entered, the Petitioner did
not have any right to a portion of the Respondent's military retirement because he did not
13

himself, at the time, have a vested right or the prospect of any future vested right to such
military retirement.
With regard to the issue of res judicata, this Court, in Masters v. Worslev, 777 P.2d
499, 503 (Utah App. 1989) stated:
Claim preclusion does not bar Masters' fraud claim because the issues have
not been fully litigated in either the original divorce nor the petition for
modification proceedings. Also, Masters' claim of non-paternity could not
have been tried in the divorce because he had no knowledge of the alleged
facts supporting his fpresentl claim. Therefore, res judicata does not justify
the trial court's grant of summary judgment [against Masters]." (Emphasis
added)
Similarly, here the Petitioner did not have knowledge of any facts which support her
present claim to the Respondent's military retirement because, at the time of the divorce, he
had not vested in any military retirement and it appeared that he would not do so in the
future.
CONCLUSION
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss should not have been granted because there is a
"substantial change in circumstance" which would justify a modification of the Decree of
Divorce and the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to the facts in this case.
DATED this

day of July, 1999.
NEIL B. CRIST & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellant

By:
1JEONARD E. McGEE
14

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT to the following individual at the address shown, via first-class mail, postage
prepaid on this ^ £ > day of July, 1999:
David S. Dolowitz
Attorney at Law
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A

Order signed by Judge Dutson December 18, 1998, and entered
December 31, 1998
Decree of Divorce

EXHIBIT B

Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 (1953, as amended)
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3 (1953, as amended)
10 USCA § 1401
10 USCA § 1408

16

UT ST § 30-3-5, Disposition of property-Maintenanc and health care of parties and
children-Division of debts-Court to have continuing irisdiction-Custody and
visitation-Determination of alimony-Nonmeritorious etition for modification
Utah Code § 30-3-5
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE
CHAPTER 3. DIVORCE
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

§

30-3-5. Disposition of propertyMaintenance and health care of parties
and children—Division of debts-Court
to have continuing jurisdictionCustody and visitation—Determination
of alimony-Nonmeritorious petition for
modification

(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the
court may include in it equitable orders relating
to the children, property, debts or obligations,
and parties.
The court shall include the
following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a
reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent
children;

Page 1

liabilities and regarding the parties' separate,
current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these
orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in
accordance with Title 62 A, Chapter 11,
Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order
determining child support, an order assigning
financial responsibility for all or a portion of
child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the
employment or training of the custodial parent.
If the court determines that the circumstances
are appropriate and that the dependent children
would be adequately cared for, it may include
an order allowing the noncustodial parent to
provide child care for the dependent children,
necessitated by the employment or training of
the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to
make subsequent changes or new orders for the
custody of the children and their support,
maintenance, health, and dental care, and for
distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
*8559 (4)(a) In determining visitation rights of
parents, grandparents, and other members of the
immediate family, the court shall consider the
best interest of the child.

(i) an order specifying which party is
responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties
contracted or incurred during marriage;

(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the
need for peace officer enforcement, the court
may include in an order establishing a visitation
schedule a provision, among other things,
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court
ordered visitation schedule entered under this
chapter.

(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding the
court's division of debts, obligations, or

(5) If a petition for modification of child
custody or visitation provisions of a court order
is made and denied, the court shall order the

(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:

Copyright (c) West Group 1998 N claim to original U.S. Govt, works
EXHIBIT A

UT ST § 30-3-5, Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care of parties and
children-Division of debts-Court to have continuing jurisdiction-Custody and
visitation-Determination of alimony-Nonmeritonous petition for modification

petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
expended by the prevailing party m that action,
if the court determines that the petition was
without merit and not asserted or defended
against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial
noncompliance with a visitation order by a
parent, a grandparent, or other member of the
immediate family pursuant to Section
78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been
previously granted by the court, the court may
award to the prevailing party costs, including
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by
the prevailing party because of the other party's
failure to provide or exercise court-ordered
visitation.
(7)(a) The court shall consider at least the
following factors m determining alimony:
(I) the financial condition and needs of the
recipient spouse;
(n) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
(m) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support; and
(IV) the length of the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the
parties m determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to
the standard of living, existing at the time of
separation, m determining alimony in
accordance with Subsection (a). However, the
court shall consider all relevant facts and
equitable principles and may, m its discretion,
base alimony on the standard of living that
existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived
or born during the marriage, the court may
consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.
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(d) The court may, under appropriate
circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves
on the threshold of a major change m the
income of one of the spouses due to the
collective efforts of both, that change shall be
considered m dividing the marital property and
m determining the amount of alimony. If one
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses
during the marriage, the court may make a
compensating adjustment m dividing the marital
property and awarding alimony.
*8560 (f) In determining alimony when a
marriage of short duration dissolves, and no
children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider restoring each
party to the condition which existed at the time
of the marriage.
(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to
make substantive changes and new orders
regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change m circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(n) The court may not modify alimony or issue
a new order for alimony to address needs of the
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree
was entered, unless the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify that action.
(in) In determining alimony, the income of any
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be
considered, except as provided m this
subsection.
(A) The court may consider the subsequent
spouse's financial ability to share living
expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the

Copyright (c) West Group 1998 No claim to original U S Govt works

EXHIBIT A

UT ST § 30-3-5, Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care of parties and
children-Division of debts-Court to have continuing jurisdiction-Custody and
visitation-Determination of alimony-Nonmeritonous petition for modification
payor's improper
consideration.

conduct

justifies

that

(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration
longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to
termination of alimony, the court finds
the
extenuating circumstances that justify thi
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.

Page 3

(9) Any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that
the former spouse is cohabitatmg with another
person.
Amended by Laws 1994, c 284, Laws 1995, c 330, § 1,
eff May 1, 1995, Laws 1997, c 232, § 4, eff July 1, 1997

HISTORICAL NOTES

(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically
provides otherwise, any order of the court that a
party pay alimony to a former spouse
automatically terminates upon the remarriage of
that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio,
payment of alimony shall resume if the party
paying alimony is made a party to the action of
annulment and his rights are determined.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Section 2 of Laws 1995, c 330 provides
"It is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of
alimony based on cohabitation with another person in
accordance with Subsection 30-3-5(9), be interpreted in
any way to condone such a relationship for any purpose "

Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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UT ST § 78-2a-3, Court of Appeals jurisdiction
Utah Code § 78-2a-3

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
P A R T I . COURTS
CHAPTER 2A. COURT OF
APPEALS
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.
§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all
writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction,
including
jurisdiction
of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies or appeals from the district court
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
the agencies, except the Public Service
Commission, State Tax Commission, School
and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees,
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;

63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving
a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for
extraordinary writs sought by persons who are
incarcerated or serving any other criminal
sentence, except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for
extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of
the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving
domestic relations cases, including, but not
limited to, divorce, annulment, property
division, child custody, support, visitation,
adoption, and paternity;
*25945 (i) appeals from the Utah Military
Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion
only and by the vote of four judges of the court
may certify to the Supreme Court for original
appellate review and determination any matter
over which the Court of Appeals has original
appellate jurisdiction.

(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other local
agencies; and

(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with
the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.

(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section

Amended by Laws 1994, c. 13; Laws 1995, c. 299, § 47,

Copyright (c) West Group 1998
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In subsection (a), the words "who are in the Retired
Reserve" are substituted for 50:927(a) (last 11 words),
since section 271 of this title prescribes the conditions
for being placed in the Retired Reserve. 50:927(b) (last
sentence) is omitted, since the revised section provides
that both lists be maintained.
In subsection (b), the words "containing the names
placed thereon under section 1202 or 1205 of this title"
are substituted for the words "upon which shall be
placed the names of all members of his service entitled
to such placement pursuant to the provisions of this
subchapter".
1958 ACT
Revised
section
1376

Source (Statutes
Large)

Source (U.S. Code)
(Uncodified!.

at

July 24, 1956, ch. 677,
5 2 (less clauses (aMi),
as
applicable
to
10:1376). 70 Stat. 623.

AMENDMENTS

1994—Pub. L. 103-337 substituted "Temporary disability retired lists" for "Retired lists" as section
catchline, struck out "(b)" before "The Secretary concerned", and struck out subsec. (a) which read as follows: "Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary
concerned, there shall be maintained retired lists containing the names of the Reserves of the armed forces
under his jurisdiction who are in the Retired Reserve." See section 12774 of this title.
1958—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 85-861 struck out provisions requiring publication of the temporary disability
retired list annually in the official register or other official publication of the armed force concerned.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1994 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 103-337 effective Dec. 1,
1994, except as otherwise provided, see section 1691 of
Pub. L. 103-337, set out as an Effective Date note
under section 10001 of this title.

Sec.
1408.
1409.
1410.
1411.
1412.

P a g e 794

FORCES

Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders. 1
Retired pay multiplier.
Restoral of full retirement amount at age 62
for members entering on or after August 1,
1986.
Rules of construction.
Rounding to next lower dollar.
AMENDMENTS

1987-Pub. L. 100-26, § 7(h)(2)(B), Apr. 21, 1987, 101
Stat. 282, substituted colon for semicolon and "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" for "Internal Revenue
Code of 1954" in item 1403.
1986-Pub. L. 99-348, title III, § 304(b)(2), July 1,
1986, 100 Stat. 703, inserted "of members who first
became members before September 8, 1980" in item
1402, substituted "Retired pay base for members who
first became members before September 8, 1980: final
basic pay" for "Limitations on revocation of retired
pay" in item 1406 and "Retired pay base for members
who first became members after September 7, 1980:
high-36 month average" for "Retired pay base" in
item 1407, and added items 1409 to 1412.
1982-Pub. L. 97-252, title X, § 1002(b), Sept. 8, 1982,
96 Stat. 735, added item 1408.
1980-Pub. L. 96-513, title V, §511(51)(C), (52KC),
Dec. 12, 1980, 94 Stat. 2924, 2925, substituted "of members who first became members after September 7,
1980" for "in case of members who first became members after the enactment of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1981" in item 1402a, and substituted "Internal Revenue Code of 1954" for "title
26" in item 1403.
Pub. L. 96-342, title VIII, § 813(a)(2), (b)(3)(B), 94
Stat. 1101,1104, added items 1402a and 1407.
1966-Pub. L. 89-718, § 3, Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1115,
substituted "8301" for "47a" in item 1404.
Pub. L. 89-652, §2(2), Oct. 14, 1966, 80 Stat. 902,
added item 1406.
1963-Pub. L. 88-132, § 5(g)(2), Oct. 2, 1963, 77 Stat.
214, added item 1401a.
1958-Pub. L. 85-422, § 11(a)(1)(B), May 20. 1958, 72
Stat. 131, added item 1405.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

CROSS REFERENCES

This section is referred to in section 1431 of this
title; title 33 section 857a; title 42 section 213a.

Length of service retirement, computation of retired
pay, see section 1315 of this title.
Physical disability retirement or separation, computation of retired pay, see section 1275 of this title.
Transfer to inactive status list instead of separation,
see section 1209 of this title.

CHAPTER 71—COMPUTATION OF RETIRED PAY
Sec.
1401.
1401a.
1402.

1402a.

1403.
1404.
1405.
1406.
1407.

Computation of retired pay.
Adjustment of retired pay and retainer pay
to reflect changes in Consumer Price
Index.
Recomputation of retired or retainer pay to
reflect later active duty of members who
first became members before September 8,
1980.
Recomputation of retired or retainer pay to
reflect later active duty of members who
first became members after September 7,
1980.
Disability retired pay: treatment under Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
Applicability of section 8301 of title 5.
Years of service.
Retired pay base for members who first
became members before September 8, 1980:
final basic pay.
Retired pay base for members who first
became members after September 7, 1980:
high-36 month average.

CHAPTER REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This chapter is referred to in sections 642, 1209,
1275, 1315 of this title; title 33 section 857a; title 42
section 213a.
§ 1401. Computation of retired pay
(a) D I S A B I L I T Y , NON-REGULAR SERVICE, W A R RANT O F F I C E R , AND D O P M A R E T I R E M E N T . — T h e

m o n t h l y r e t i r e d p a y of a p e r s o n e n t i t l e d t h e r e t o u n d e r t h i s s u b t i t l e is c o m p u t e d a c c o r d i n g t o
t h e following table. F o r each case covered by a
s e c t i o n of t h i s t i t l e n a m e d i n t h e c o l u m n
h e a d e d " F o r s e c t i o n s " , r e t i r e d p a y is c o m p u t e d
b y t a k i n g , i n order, t h e s t e p s p r e s c r i b e d o p p o s i t e it i n c o l u m n s 1, 2, 3, a n d 4, a s m o d i f i e d b y
t h e applicable footnotes.
1
Section catchline amended by Pub. L. 102-190 without corresponding amendment of chapter analysis.
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For
sections

Formula

No.

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Column 4

Take

Multiply by

Add

Subtract

1

1201
1204

Retired pay base as computed As member elects—
(1) 2'/.% of years of servunder section 1406(b) or 1407.
ice credited to him under
section 1208; • or
(2) the percentage of disability on date when retired.

2

1202
1205

Retired pay base as computed
under section 1406(b) or 1407.

As member elects—
(1) 2xh% of years of service credited to him under
section 1208. » or
(2) the percentage of disability on date when his
name was placed on temporary disability retired list.

580
1263
1293
1305

Retired pay base as computed
under section 1406(b) or 1407.

The retired pay multiplier
prescribed
in
section
1409(a) for the years of
service credited to him
under section 1405.

633
634
635
636
1251

Retired pay base as computed The retired pay multiplier
under section 1406(b) or 1407. prescribed
in
section
1409(a) for the years of
service credited to him
under section 1405.

X *
u > J
-

j

1 '4
tt>
5

v

fH »
u

*>
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Excess over 75% of
retired pay base
upon which
computation is
based.
Amount necessary to
increase product of
columns 1 and 2 to
50% of retired pay
base
upon
which
computation
is
based.

Excess over 75% of
retired pay base
upon which
computation is
based.

1
Before applying percentage factor, credit each full month of service that is in addition to the number of full years of service
creditable to the member as one-twelfth of a year and disregard any remaining fractional part of a month.

Ub) U S E OF MOST FAVORABLE FORMULA.—If

a

person would otherwise be entitled t o retired
pay computed under more than one formula of
the table in subsection (a) or of a n y o t h e r provision of law, t h e person is entitled to be paid
under the applicable formula that is most favorable to him.
(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A S t a t . 106; M a y 20.
1958, Pub. L. 85-422, §§6(7), 11(a)(2), 72 S t a t .
129, 131; Oct. 2, 1963, Pub. L. 88-132, § 5(h)(1),
77 Stat. 214; Aug. 21, 1965, Pub. L. 89-132, § 6,
79 Stat. 547; Dec. 16, 1967, Pub. L. 90-207,
§ 3(1), 81 Stat. 653; Oct. 2, 1972, Pub. L. 92-455,
§ 1, 86 Stat. 761; Sept. 8, 1980, Pub. L. 96-342,
title VIII, § 813(b)(1), 94 S t a t . 1102; Dec. 12,
1980, Pub. L. 96-513, title I, § 113(a), title V,
§511(49), 94 Stat. 2876, 2924; Sept. 24, 1983,
Pub. L. 98-94, title IX, §§ 922(a)(1), 923(a)(1),
(2XA), 97 Stat. 641, 642; Oct. 30, 1984, Pub. L.
98-557, § 35(b), 98 Stat. 2877; July 1, 1986, Pub.
L. 99-348, title II, § 201(a), 100 S t a t . 691; Oct.
23, 1992, Pub. L. 102-484, div. A, title X,
§ 1052(18), 106 Stat. 2500; Oct. 5, 1994, Pub. L.
103-337, div. A, title XVI, § 1662(j)(2), 108 S t a t .
3004.)

Revised
section
1401
• Introductory
clause.
1401(1).

HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES—Continued
Revised
section
1401(2)

1401(3)
1401(4)

1401.
footnote 1.
1401.
footnote 2.
1401.
footnote 3.

Source (U.S. Code)
37:272(d) (1st 29. and
51st through 55th,
words, and 4th proviso).
10:1036b (1st 91 words
and 1st proviso).
34:440j (1st 91 words
and 1st proviso).
10:600/(d) (2d sentence).
10:600Z(f)
(last
sentence).
34:430(d) (2d sentence)
34:430(f) (last sentence).
[No source].

Source (Statutes at
Large)
May 29. 1954. ch. 249.
§ 14(d) (less 1st sentence), (f) (1st sentence, less applicability to retired grade:
and last sentence), 68
Stat. 163. 164.

[No source].
37:272(d) (1st proviso);
10.600/(d) (less 1st and
2d sentences).
34:430(d) (less 1st and
2d sentences).

In the introductory paragraph, the applicability of
the rule stated in the third sentence to situations not
expressly covered by the laws named in the source
statutes above is a practical construction that the rule
must be reciprocally applied in all cases.
In formula No. 1, the words "whichever is earlier",
in 37:272(d) (clause (2)), are omitted, since they are
contrary to the rule stated in 37.272(e) (1st proviso of
last sentence).
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
In formula No. 3, the computation is based on
monthly pay instead of annual pay to conform to the
Source (Statutes at
Source (U.S. Code)
Large)
other formulas of the revised section. The words
"basic pay" are substituted for the words "base and
10:600Kf) (1st sentence, June 29. 1948. ch. 708. longevity pay" to conform to the terminology of the
§303 (1st 91 words
less applicability to reCareer Compensation Act of 1949 (37 U.S.C. 231 et
and 1st proviso). 62
tired grade).
seq.). The words "which he would receive if serving, at
Stat. 1088.
34:430(f) (1st sentence,
less applicability to re- Oct. 12. 1949. ch. 681, the time granted such pay, on active duty" are omit§§ 402(d) (less 30th
tired grade).
ted as surplusage and to conform to the other formuthrough 55th words;
37.272(d) (less 1st 55
las of the revised section, since the effect of these
less 104th through
words:
less
104 th
128th words, as applithrough 128th words,
words is covered by footnote l.-The words "at any
cable to retired grade;
as applicable to reand less 2d. 5th. and time" are substituted for the words "during his entire
tired grade; and less
period of service".
1st. 2d. 4th. 5th. and last provisos). 402(e)
(1st proviso of last
last provisos).
Footnotes 1 and 2 reflect the long-standing construcsentence). 63 Stat.
37:272(e) (1st proviso of
tion of those provisions dealing with computation of
818. 819.
last sentence).
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REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 1331 of this title, referred to in subsecs.
(c)'l) and (d)(1), was renumbered section 12731 of this
title and amended generally by Pub. L. 103-337. div. A.
title XVI, §1662(j)(l), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 2998,
2999. A new section 1331 was added by section
1662(j)(7) of Pub. L. 103-337.
Chapter 67 of this title, referred to in subsec. (d)(1),
was transferred to part II of subtitle E of this title, renumbered as chapter 1223, and amended generally by
Pub. L. 103-337, div. A, title XVI, § 1662(j)(l), Oct. 5,
1994, 108 Stat. 2998. A new chapter 67 (§ 1331) of this
title was added by section 1662(j)(7) of Pub. L.
103-337.
PRIOR PROVISIONS

A prior section 1407, added Pub. L. 96-342, title VIII,
§ 813(a)(1), Sept. 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 1100; amended Pub.
L. 96-513, title I, § 113(c), title V, §§501(21), 511(53),
Dec. 12, 1980, 94 Stat. 2877, 2908, 2925, related to determination of retired base pay, prior to repeal by
Pub. L. 99-348, § 104(b).
AMENDMENTS

1994—Subsec.
(c)(2)(B).
Pub.
L.
103-337,
§ 1662(j)(5)(A), which directed substitution of "chapter 1223" for "chapter 67", could not be executed because the words "chapter 67" did not appear subsequent to amendment by Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2),
(4). See 1989 Amendment note below.
Subsec. (f)(2). Pub. L. 103-337, § 1662(j)(5)(B), which
directed amendment of subsec. (f)(2) by substituting
"Chapter 1223" for "Chapter 67" in heading and "section 12731" for "section 1331" in text, could not be executed because of previous repeal of subsec. (f) by
Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2). See 1989 Amendment note
below.
1989—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(1), (b)(2),
substituted "person" for "member", "person's" for
"members", and "subsection (c) or (d)" for "subsection (c)".
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2), (4), added
subsec. (c) and struck out former subsec. (c) which related to computation of high-three average.
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(4), added
subsec. (d). Former subsec. (d) redesignated (e).
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2), (3), redesignated subsec. (d) as (e) and struck out former subsec.
(e) which related to special rules for short-term disability retirees.
Subsecs. (f), (g). Pub. L. 101-189, § 651(a)(2), struck
out subsec. (f) which related to special rule for members retiring with non-regular service, and subsec. (g)
which defined the term "years of creditable service".
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1994

AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 103-337 effective Dec. 1,
1994, except as otherwise provided, see section 1691 of
Pub. L. 103-337, set out as an Effective Date note
under section 10001 of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 1401, 1402a,
3991, 3992, 6151, 6333, 6334, 8991, 8992, 12739 of this
title; title 14 sections 357, 423, 424; title 33 section
853o; title 42 sections 211, 212.
§ 1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: ,

(1) The term "court" means—
(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of
any State, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam,
American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands;

(B) any court of the United States (as defined in section 451 of title 28) having competent jurisdiction; and
(C) any court of competent jurisdiction of
a foreign country with which the United
States has an agreement requiring the
United States to honor any court order of
such country.
(2) The term "court order" means a final
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or
legal separation issued by a court, or a court
ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such a decree (including a
final decree modifying the terms of a previously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such previously issued
decree), which—
(A) is issued in accordance with the laws
of the jurisdiction of that court;
(B) provides for—
(i) payment of child support (as defined
in section 462(b) of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 662(b)));
(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in
section 462(c) of the Social Security Act
(42 U.S.C. 662(c))); or
(iii) division of property (including a division of community property); and
(C) in the case of a division of property,
specifically provides for the payment of an
amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired pay, from the
disposable retired pay of a member to the
spouse or former spouse of that member.
(3) The term "final decree" means a decree
from which no appeal may be taken or from
which no appeal has been taken within the
time allowed for taking such appeals under
the laws applicable to such appeals, or a
decree from which timely appeal has been
taken and such appeal has been finally decided under the laws applicable to such appeals.
(4) The term "disposable retired pay"
means the total monthly retired pay to which
a'member is entitled less amounts which—
(A) are owed by that member to the
United States for previous overpayments of
retired pay and for recoupments required
by law resulting from entitlement to retired
pay;
(B) are deducted from the retired pay of
such member as a result of forfeitures of retired pay ordered by a court-martial or as a
result of a waiver of retired pay required by
law in order to receive compensation under
title 5 or title 38;
(C) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay under chapter 61 of this title, are
equal to the amount of retired pay of the
member under that chapter computed using
the percentage of the member's disability
on the date when the member was retired
(or the date on which the member's name
was placed on the temporary disability retired list); or
(D) are deducted because of an election
under chapter 73 of this title to provide an
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annuity to a spouse or former spouse to
whom payment of a portion of such member's retired pay is being made p u r s u a n t to
a court order under this section.
(5) T h e term " m e m b e r " includes a former
member entitled t o retired pay under section
1331 l of this title.
(6) T h e term "spouse or former spouse"
means t h e husband or wife, or former husband or wife, respectively, of a member who,
on or before t h e date of a court order, was
married t o t h a t member.
(7) T h e term "retired p a y " includes retainer
pay.
(b) EFFECTIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS.—For

the

purposes of this section—
(1) service of a court order is effective if—
(A) a n appropriate agent of t h e Secretary
concerned designated for receipt of service
of court orders under regulations prescribed
p u r s u a n t t o subsection (i) or, if^no agent
has been so designated, t h e Secretary concerned, is personally served or is served by
certified or registered mail, r e t u r n receipt
requested;
(B) t h e court order is regular on its face;
(C) t h e court order or o t h e r documents
served with t h e court order identify t h e
member concerned a n d include, if possible,
the social security n u m b e r of such member;
and
(D) t h e court order or o t h e r documents
served with t h e court order certify t h a t t h e
rights of t h e member under t h e Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50
U.S.C. App. 501 e t seq.) were observed; a n d
(2) a court order is regular on its face if t h e
order—
(A) is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(B) is legal in form; and
(C) includes n o t h i n g on its face t h a t provides reasonable notice t h a t it is issued
without a u t h o r i t y of law.

§1408

(2) Notwithstanding a n y o t h e r provision of
law, this section does not create any right, title,
or interest which can be sold, assigned, transferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by
inheritance) by a spouse or former spouse. Payments by t h e Secretary concerned under subsection (d) t o a spouse or former spouse with respect to a division of retired pay as t h e property of a member and t h e member's spouse under
this subsection may n o t be treated as a m o u n t s
received as retired pay for service in t h e uniformed services.
(3) This section does n o t authorize any court
to order a member to apply for retirement or
retire a t a particular time in order to effectuate
any p a y m e n t under this section.
(4) A court may n o t t r e a t t h e disposable retired pay of a member in t h e m a n n e r described
in p a r a g r a p h (1) unless t h e court h a s jurisdiction over t h e member by reason of (A) his residence, o t h e r t h a n because of military assignment, in t h e territorial jurisdiction of t h e court,
(B) his domicile in t h e territorial jurisdiction of
t h e court, or (C) his consent t o t h e jurisdiction
of t h e court.
(d) PAYMENTS BY SECRETARY CONCERNED T o
SPOUSE OR FORMER SPOUSE.—(1) After effective

service on t h e Secretary concerned of a court
order providing for t h e p a y m e n t of child support or alimony or, with respect t o a division of
property, specifically providing for t h e paym e n t of a n a m o u n t of t h e disposable retired
pay from a member t o t h e spouse or a former
spouse of t h e member, t h e Secretary shall
make payments (subject to t h e limitations of
this section) from t h e disposable retired pay of
t h e member t o t h e spouse or former spouse in
an a m o u n t sufficient t o satisfy t h e a m o u n t of
child support a n d alimony set forth in t h e
court order and, with respect to a division of
property, in t h e a m o u n t of disposable retired
pay specifically provided for in t h e court order.
In t h e case of a member entitled to receive retired pay on t h e date of t h e effective service of
t h e court order, such payments shall begin n o t
(c) AUTHORITY FOR COURT T o TREAT RETIRED
later t h a n 90 days after t h e date of effective
service. I n t h e case of a member not entitled t o
PAY AS PROPERTY OF THE MEMBER AND SPOUSE.—
(1) Subject to t h e limitations of this section, a receive retired pay on t h e date of t h e effective
court may t r e a t disposable retired pay payable service of t h e court order, such payments shall
to a member for pay periods beginning after begin n o t later t h a n 90 days after t h e date on
June 25, 1981, either as property solely of t h e which t h e member first becomes entitled to remember or as property of t h e member and his ceive retired pay.
spouse in accordance with t h e law of t h e juris(2) If t h e spouse or former spouse to whom
diction of such court. A court may not t r e a t re- payments are t o be made under this section was
tired pay as property in any proceeding to not married to t h e member for a period of 10
divide or partition any a m o u n t of retired pay of
years or more during which t h e member pera member as t h e property of t h e member a n d formed a t least 10 years of service creditable in
the member's spouse or former spouse if a final determining t h e member's eligibility for retired
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or pay, payments may not be made under this seclegal separation (including a court ordered, rati- tion t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t they include a n a m o u n t
fied, or approved property settlement incident resulting from t h e t r e a t m e n t by t h e court
to such decree) affecting t h e member a n d t h e under subsection (c) of disposable retired pay of
member's spouse or former spouse (A) was t h e member as property of t h e member or
issued before J u n e 25, 1981, a n d (B) did n o t property of t h e member and his spouse.
treat (or reserve jurisdiction to t r e a t ) a n y
(3) P a y m e n t s under this section shall n o t be
amount of retired pay of t h e member as proper- made more frequently t h a n once each m o n t h ,
ty of t h e member a n d t h e member's spouse or and t h e Secretary concerned shall n o t be reformer spouse.
quired t o vary normal pay a n d disbursement
cycles for retired pay in order t o comply with a
1
court order.
See References in Text note below
FYHTRTT A
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(4) Payments from the disposable retired pay
of a member pursuant to this section shall terminate in accordance with the terms of the applicable court order, but not later than the date
of the death of the member or the date of the
death of the spouse or former spouse to whom
payments are being made, whichever occurs
first.
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1)
provides for a division of property (including a
division of community property) in addition to
an amount of child support or alimony or the
payment of an amount of disposable retired
pay as the result of the courts treatment of
such pay under subsection (c) as property of
the member and his spouse, the Secretary concerned shall pay (subject to the limitations of
this section) from the disposable retired pay of
the member to the spouse or former spouse of
the member, any part of the amount payable to
the spouse or former spouse under the division
of property upon effective service of a final
court order of garnishment of such amount
from such retired pay.
(e) LIMITATIONS.—(1) The total amount of the
disposable retired pay of a member payable
under all court orders pursuant to subsection
(c) may not exceed 50 percent of such disposable retired pay.
(2) In the event of effective service of more
than one court order which provide for payment to a spouse and one or more former
spouses or to more than one former spouse, the
disposable retired pay of the member shall be
used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of
paragraph (1)) such court orders on a firstcome, first-served basis. Such court orders shall
be satisfied (subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) out of that amount of disposable retired pay which remains after the satisfaction
of all court orders which have been previously
served.
(3)(A) In the event of effective service of conflicting court orders under this section which
assert to direct that different amounts be paid
during a month to the same spouse or former
spouse of the same member, the Secretary concerned shall—
(i) pay to that spouse from the member's
disposable retired pay the least amount directed to be paid during that month by any
such conflicting court order, but not more
than the amount of disposable retired pay
which remains available for payment of such
court orders based on when such court orders
were effectively served and the limitations of
paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4);
(rixretain an amount of disposable retired
pay maf is equal to the lesser of—
(I) the difference between the largest
amount required by any conflicting court
order to be paid to the spouse or former
spouse and the amount payable to the
spouse or former spouse under clause (i);
and
(II) the amount of disposable retired pay
which remains available for payment of any
conflicting court order based on when such
court order was effectively served and the
limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); and
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(iii) pay to that member the amount which
is equal to the amount of that member's disposable retired pay (less any amount paid
during such month pursuant to legal process
served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) and any amount paid
during such month pursuant to court orders
effectively served under this section, other
than such conflicting court orders) minus—
(I) the amount of disposable retired pay
paid under clause (i); and
(II) the amount of disposable retired pay
retained under clause (ii).
(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the
amount retained under clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) until such time as that Secretary is
provided with a court order which has been certified by the member and the spouse or former
spouse to be valid and applicable to the retained amount. Upon being provided with such
an order, the Secretary shall pay the retained
amount in accordance with the order.
(4)(A) In the event of effective service of a
court order under this section and the service
of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), both of
which provide for payments during a month
from the same member, satisfaction of such
court orders and legal process from the retired
pay of the member shall be on a first-come,
first-served basis. Such court orders and legal
process shall be satisfied out of moneys which
are subject to such orders and legal process and
which remain available in accordance with the
limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph
(B) of this paragraph during such month after
the satisfaction of all court orders or legal process which have been previously served.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the total amount of the disposable retired
pay of a member payable by the Secretary concerned under all court orders pursuant to this
section and all legal processes pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
659) with respect to a member may not exceed
65 percent of the amount of the retired pay
payable to such member that is considered
under section 462 of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration for employment
that is payable by the United States.
(5) A court order which itself or because of
previously served court orders provides for the
payment of an amount which exceeds the
amount of disposable retired pay available for
payment because of the limit set forth in paragraph (1), or which, because of previously
served court orders or legal process previously
served under section 459 of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 659), provides for payment of an
amount that exceeds the maximum amount
permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph
(B) of paragraph (4), shall not be considered to
be irregular on its face solely for that reason.
However, such order shall be considered to be
fully satisfied for purposes of this section by
the payment to the spouse or former spouse of
the maximum amount of disposable retired pay
permitted under paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4).
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(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed
to relieve a member of liability for the payment
of alimony, child support, or other payments
required by a court order on the grounds that
payments made out of disposable retired pay
under this section have been made in the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). Any such
unsatisfied obligation of a member may be enforced by any means available under law other
than the means provided under this section in
any case in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and
under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 659) in any case in which the maximum
amount permitted under subparagraph (B) of
paragraph (4) has been paid.
(f) IMMUNITY OF OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF

UNITED STATES.—(1) The United States and any

officer or employee of the United States shall
not be liable with respect to any payment made
from retired pay to any member, spouse, or
former spouse pursuant to a court order that is
regular on its face if such payment is made in
accordance with this section and the regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i).
(2) An officer or employee of the United
States who, under regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i), has the duty to respond to
interrogatories shall not be subject under any
law to any disciplinary action or civil or criminal liability or penalty for, or because of, any
disclosure of information made by him in carrying out any of his duties which directly or indirectly pertain to answering such interrogatories.
(g) NOTICE To MEMBER OF SERVICE OF COURT
ORDER O N SECRETARY CONCERNED.—A person re-

ceiving effective service of a court order under
this section shall, as soon as possible, but not
later than 30 days after the date on which effective service is made, send a written notice of
such court order (together with a copy of such
order) to the member affected by the court
order at his last known address.
(h) BENEFITS FOR DEPENDENTS W H O ARE VICTIMS OF ABUSE BY MEMBERS LOSING RIGHT TO

RETIRED PAY.—(1) If, in the case of a member or
former member of the armed forces referred to
in paragraph (2)(A), a court order provides (in
the manner applicable to a division of property)
for the payment of an amount from the disposable retired pay of that member or former
member (as certified under paragraph (4)) to
an eligible spouse or former spouse of that
member or former member, the Secretary concerned, beginning upon effective service of such
court order, shall pay that amount in accordance with this subsection to such spouse or
former spouse.
(2) A spouse or former spouse of a member or
former member of the armed forces is eligible
to receive payment under this subsection if—
(A) the member or former member, while a
member of the armed forces and after becoming eligible to be retired from the armed
forces on the basis of years of service, has eligibility to receive retired pay terminated as a
result of misconduct while a member involving abuse of a spouse or dependent child (as
defined in regulations prescribed by the Sec-
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retary of Defense or, for the Coast Guard
when it is not operating as a service in the
Navy, by the Secretary of Transportation);
and
(B) the spouse or former spouse—
(i) was the victim of the abuse and was
married to the member or former member
at the time of that abuse; or
(ii) is a natural or adopted parent of a dependent child of the member or former
member who was the victim of the £(&£&**»
(3) The amount certified by the Secretary
concerned under paragraph (4) with respect to
a member or former member of the armed
forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall be
deemed to be the disposable retired pay of that
member or former member for the purposes of
this subsection.
(4) Upon the request of a court or an eligible
spouse or former spouse of a member or former
member of the armed forces referred to in
paragraph (2)(A) in connection with a civil
action for the issuance of a court order in the
case of that member or former member, the
Secretary concerned shall determine and certify the amount of the monthly retired pay that
the member or former member would have
been entitled to receive as of the date of the
certification—
(A) if the member or former member's eligibility for retired pay had not been terminated
as described in paragraph (2)(A); and
(B) if, in the case of a member or former
member not in receipt of retired pay immediately before that termination of eligibility for
retired pay, the member or former member
had retired on the effective date of that termination of eligibility.
(5) A court order under this subsection may
provide that whenever retired pay is increased
under section 1401a of this title (or any other
provision of law), the amount payable under
the court order to the spouse or former spouse
of a member or former member described in
paragraph (2)(A) shall be increased at the same
time by the percent by which the retired pay of
the member or former member would have
been increased if the member or former
member were receiving retired pay.
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, a member or former member of the armed
forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall
have no ownership interest in, or claim against,
any amount payable under this section to a
spouse or former spouse of the member or
former member.
(7)(A) If a former spouse receiving payments
under this subsection with respect to a member
or former member referred to in paragraph
(2)(A) marries again after such payments begin,
the eligibility of the former spouse to receive
further payments under this subsection shall
terminate on the date of such marriage.
(B) A person's eligibility to receive payments
under this subsection that is terminated under
subparagraph (A) by reason of remarriage shall
be resumed in the event of the termination of
that marriage by the death of that person's
spouse or by annulment or divorce. The re-
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sumption of payments shall begin as of the first
day of the month in which that marriage is so
terminated. The monthly amount of the payments shall be the amount that would have
been paid if the continuity of the payments
had not been interrupted by the marriage.
(8) Payments in accordance with this subsection shall be made out of funds in the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund established by section 1461 of this title or, in the
case of the Coast Guard, out of funds appropriated to the Department of Transportation for
payment of retired pay for the Coast Guard.
(9)(A) A spouse or former spouse of a member
or former member of the armed forces referred
to in paragraph (2)(A), while receiving payments in accordance with this subsection, shall
be entitled to receive medical and dental care,
to use commissary and exchange stores, and to
receive any other benefit that a spouse or a
former spouse of a retired member of the
armed forces is entitled to receive on the basis
of being a spouse or former spouse, as the case
may be, of a retired member of the armed
forces in the same manner as if the member or
former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A)
was entitled to retired pay.
(B) A dependent child of a member or former
member referred to in paragraph (2XA) who
was a member of the household of the member
or former member at the time of the misconduct described in paragraph (2)(A) shall be entitled to receive medical and dental care, to use
commissary and exchange stores, and to have
other benefits provided to dependents of retired members of the armed forces in the same
manner as if the member or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) was entitled to retired pay.
(C) If a spouse or former spouse or a dependent child eligible or entitled to receive a particular benefit under this paragraph is eligible
or entitled to receive that benefit under another provision of law, the eligibility or entitlement of that spouse or former spouse or dependent child to such benefit shall be determined under such other provision of law instead of this paragraph.
(10XA) For purposes of this subsection, in the
case of a member of the armed forces who has
been sentenced by a court-martial to receive a
punishment that will terminate the eligibility
of that member to receive retired pay if executed, the eligibility of that member to receive retired pay may, as determined by the Secretary
concerned, be considered terminated effective
upon the approval of that sentence by the
persori1*K*ji!*&ninder section 860(c) of this title
(article 60(c) of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice).
(B) If each form of the punishment that
would result in the termination of eligibility to
receive retired pay is later remitted, set aside,
or mitigated to a punishment that does not
result in the termination of that eligibility, a
payment of benefits to the eligible recipient
under this subsection that is based on the punishment so vacated, set aside, or mitigated shall
cease. The cessation of payments shall be effective as of the first day of the first month following the month in which the Secretary con-

cerned notifies the recipient of such benefits in
writing that payment of the benefits will cease.
The recipient may not be required to repay the
benefits received before that effective date
(except to the extent necessary to recoup any
amount that was erroneous when paid).
(11) In this subsection, the term "dependent
child", with respect to a member or former
member of the armed forces referred to in
paragraph (2)(A), means an unmarried legitimate child, including an adopted child or a
stepchild of the member or former member,
who—
(A) is under 18 years of age;
(B) is incapable of self-support because of a
mental or physical incapacity that existed
before becoming 18 years of age and is dependent on the member or former member
for over one-half of the child's support; or
(C) if enrolled in a full-time course of study
in an institution of higher education recognized by the Secretary of Defense for the
purposes of this subparagraph, is under 23
years of age and is dependent on the member
or former member for over one-half of the
child's support.
(i) REGULATIONS.—The Secretaries concerned
shall prescribe uniform regulations for the administration of this section.
(Added Pub. L. 97-252, title X, § 1002(a), Sept.
8, 1982, 96 Stat. 730; amended Pub. L. 98-525,
title VI, §643(a)-(d), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat.
2547; Pub. L. 99-661, div. A, title VI, § 644(a),
Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat. 3887; Pub. L. 100-26,
§§ 3(3), 7(h)(1), Apr. 21, 1987, 101 Stat. 273, 282;
Pub. L. 101-189, div. A, title VI, § 653(a)(5), title
XVI, § 1622(e)(6), Nov. 29, 1989, 103 Stat. 1462,
1605; Pub. L. 101-510, div. A, title V,
§ 555(a)-(d), (f), (g), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1569,
1570; Pub. L. 102-190, div. A, title X,
§ 1061(a)(7), Dec. 5, 1991, 105 Stat. 1472; Pub. L.
102-484, div. A, title VI, § 653(a), Oct. 23, 1992,
106 Stat. 2426; Pub. L. 103-160, div. A, title V,
§ 555(a), (b), title XI, § 1182(a)(2), Nov. 30, 1993,
107 Stat. 1666, 1771.)
REFERENCES IN TEXT

Section 1331 of this title, referred to in subsec.
(a)(5), was renumbered section 12731 of this title and
amended generally by Pub. L. 103-337, div. A, title
XVI, § 1662(j)(l), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 2998, 2999. A
new section 1331 was added by section 1662(j)(7) of
Pub. L. 103-337.
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, referred
to in subsec. (b)(1)(D), is act Oct. 17, 1940, ch. 888, 54
Stat. 1178, as amended, which is classified to section
501 et seq. of the Appendix to Title 50, War and National Defense. For complete classification of this Act
to the Code, see section 501 of the Appendix to Title
50 and Tables.
AMENDMENTS

4993—Subsecs. (b)(1)(A), (f)(1), (2). Pub. L. 103-160,
§ 1182(a)(2)(A), substituted "subsection (i)" for "subsection (h)".
Subsec. (h)(2)(A). Pub. L. 103-160, § 555(b)(1), inserted "or, for the Coast Guard when it is not operating as
a service in the Navy, by the Secretary of Transportation" after "Secretary of Defense".
Subsec. (h)(4)(B). Pub. L. 103-160, § 1182(a)(2)(B),
inserted "of" after "of that termination".
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (Bar No. 0899)
of and for
COHNE. RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
525 East First South. Fifth Floor
P.O.Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Attorney for Respondent

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY,
OGDEN DEPARTMENT. STATE OF UTAH

DIANA CHILDS (flea Diana Callahan),
Petitioner,

;)
)
]

ORDER
(December 1,1998 Hearing)

v.

])

Civil No. 820980786

WILLIAM K. CALLAHAN,

;)

Judge: Roger S. Dutson

Respondent,

)

The above-captioned matter came before the Court, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson
presiding, on Tuesday, the 1st day of December, 1998. The Petitioner was present in person and
represented by counsel, Neil B. Crist. The Respondent was present is person and represented by
counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The Court, after hearing the arguments and representations of
counsel and having had the opportunity to review the written submittals, including the affidavits
submitted by the Petitioner and the legal authority submitted by each of the parties, finds and
determines that there are no relevant factual disputes in this matter as the Respondent has filed a
Motion to Dismiss and, therefore, admits for the purpose of that motion all facts alleged by the
Petitioner are true, that the argument of the Petitioner that she did not know she had a right to
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assert a claim against the military retirement of the Respondent in 1982 or 1985 (the years in
which she appeared before the Court) is not a basis for a claim asserted in 1998, fifteen years
after the Decree of Divorce was entered and thirteen years after she has appeared before the
Court and requested a modification of the decree, that the Petitioner has presented no evidence of
a substantial change in circumstances factually, that the Utah Court of Appeals in Toone v.
Toone. 952 P.2d 112 (Utah App. 1998) has established the law in Utah that a change in law is not
enough to constitute a substantial change of circumstances justifying the reopening of a decree of
divorce, that no other facts have been presented to the Court which would support a finding of a
substantial change in the circumstances of the parties, that while it is true that when the Decree of
Divorce was granted in 1982, because of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in McCarty v.
McCarty 453 U.S. 210 (1981), which decision was, in effect, reversed by the Congress of the
United States when it passed Public Law 97-252, commonly referred to as the Uniform Services
Former Spouse's Protection Act which permitted parties who had been divorced between the
rendering of the McCarty decision in 1981 and the passage of the law in 1983 either to return to
court or, if they were in court, to make claims for military retirement that had been accumulated
during the marriage, if state law permitted such an action, that more than thirteen years had
passed since the last hearing in this case and the primary basis on which the Petitioner asserts her
claim is of the Uniform Services Former Spouse's Protection Act which has been existence in the
thirteen years since this matter was last heard, and that the Petitioner's strongest argument is the
change in Federal statutes. The policy of res judicata is to put all issues that have been or could
have been presented to the court to rest and, based on these factors, the Court concludes that,
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pursuant to the ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals in Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112 (Utah App.
1998) and the principals of res judicata, the Respondent's motion to dismiss should be granted.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
Respondent's motion to dismiss the Petitioner's petition to modify the decree of divorce is
granted and that petition is dismissed^
DATED this / / day of Jj-e^~

, 1998.
BY THE G

ROGER S/DUTSON
Second Judicial District Court Judge

APPROVED AS REFLECTING THE
RULING OF THE COURT:

<7
NEIL B. CRIST
Attorney for Petitioner

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of COHNE,
RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C., 525 East 100 South, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
that on the

; day of^fcZ^ag*-

, 1998,1 caused a true and correct copy of the

foregoing [Proposed] Order (December 1,1998 Hearing)to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, upon:

Neil B. Crist
380 North 200 West, Suite 260
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for Petitioner
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ANN PARKER JUDD
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^ ^ 1
Attorney for PlaintJiff
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IN THE SECOND J U D I C I A L

D I S T R I C T CdNIiT^rflF WEBER COUNTY,

STATE OF. CJTAH
CiAcJj

DIANA CALLAHAN,
Plaintiff,
DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
WILLIAM K. CALLAHAN,
Defendant.

)

Civil No. 80786

The above-entitled matter was heard before the aboveentitled Court on the 5th day of March, 1982, the Honorable Calvin
Gould presiding.

The plaintiff was personally present and

represented by her counsel, Ann Parker Judd; the defendant was
not present, nor was he represented by counsel.

The plaintiff

was sworn and testified in support of the allegations appearing
in her Complaint and the written Stipulation and Agreement of the
parties was presented to the Court. The Court having entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being fully advised
in the premises, now,
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce

divorcing her from the defendant, which divorce shall become final
and absolute upon the signing and entry of the divorce decree.
2.

The plaintiff waives the payment of alimony.

3.

The plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and con-

trol of the minor children, to-wit:

Nicki Leona Callahan, age

ten (10) years, and Traci Elease Callahan, age eight *(8) years.
The defendant is granted the right of reasonable visitation upon
the giviay oi cwenuy-four hours notice to the plaintiff. The
defendant is granted up to forty-five days extended visitation
during the summer months upon the giving of two weeks notice to the
plaintiff of his intent to exercise said summer visitation. The
plaintiff is granted reasonable rights of visitation during the
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defendant's extended summer visitation.
4.
the sum of

The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff
$152.00 per month per child as child support for a

total child support obligation of $304.00 per month, to be payable
through the Clerk, of the above named Court, and to commence with
the month of March, 1982.
5.

The defendant is ordered to help the plaintiff

with one-half the cost of Christmas and school clothes for the
minor children.
6.

The plaintiff is awarded the following described

properties;
a.

The real property and premises at 568 Fowler,

Ogden, Utah, subject to the mortgage and utility payments due
which the plaintiff will assume and pay saving the defendant
harmless therefrom, and, subject to a non-interest bearing
Judgment Lien to the favor of the defendant in the sum of seven
hundred and fifty dollars ($750.00).

The Judgment Lien will be

payable to the defendant within a reasonable time following the
earliest occurrence of the plaintiff's remarriage, her sale of the
property and premises or within two years of the finalization of
the divorce.

If the seven hundred and fifty dollars ($750.00) is

due because of the passage of two years, three hundred and seventy
five dollars ($375.00) is due within three (3) months and the
remaining three hundred and fifty dollars ($350.00) is due within
the next three (3) months.
b.

The household furniture, furnishings, fixtures

and equipment now in her possession, with the exception of the
ice chest, the carved Teak chest and the Peacock chair; and the
Mommasan chair and footstool.
c.

The 1979 Honda Civic automobile, subject to

any mortgage payments thereon.

7.

d.

The savings account.

e.

Her personal effects.

The defendant is awarded the following described
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properties.
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a.

'"""'

»

The seven hundred and fifty dollar

($750.00)

Judgment Lien, subject to the above mentioned conditions.
b.

The 1974 Maverick automobile, subject to any

payments thereon.
c.

The furniture presently in his possession, the

ice chest, the carved Teak Chest and the Peacock chair.

The

Mommasan Chair and the footstool will go to the plaintiff.
8.

The plaintiff is ordered to assume and be respon-

sible for the home improvement loan payments and the debts and
obligations incurred by her subsequent to the separation of the
parties.
9.

The defendant is ordered to assume and be responsible

for the debt on the Fiat automobile, the Master Charge debt and
his separate debts and obligations incurred subsequent to the
separation of the parties.
10.

When the minor children reach the age of twelve

(12) years, they may decide whether they will live with the
plaintiff or the defendant.
11.

If the plaintiff moves from the Weber County area,

she is ordered to give the defendant a thrity (30) day written
notice of her new address and telephone number.
12.

The defendant is ordered to maintain the minor

children as beneficiaries on his life insurance policy.
13.

The plaintiff is ordered to maintain health and

accident insurance on the minor children if it is obtainable
through her place of employment.

The defendant is ordered to

assume and be responsible for one-half of the yearly insurance
deductible for each minor child.

If the twenty percent (20%) of

the medical costs which the insurance company does not pay should
exceed $100.00 for the year, the defendant will share all costs
over $100.00 for each child.
14.
defendant's

The child

support of $304.00

representation

to the plaintiff

earnings of $1,N')0.00 per m o n t h .

is based upon
that he has

the

gross

|UcOfde4 B«ok
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15.

The plaintiff may claim the minor child, Nicki,

and the defendant may claim the minor child, Traci, as exemptions
for income tax purposes.
16.

The defendant is ordered responsible for one-half

of plaintiff's attorney's fees in the amount of $175.00.
DATED this

j Q

day of March, 1982.
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